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We are celebrating Chief Judge Randall Rader’s service to the 
federal court over the past 20 years. His opinions reflect his 
exceptional background in patent law, experience in the trial and 
appellate courts, participation in the legislative branch, dedication 
to teaching, breadth of international scholarship, and thoughtful 
writing. Therefore, it is fitting that we gain special insight into his 
opinions and reflect on his over 20 years as a Federal Circuit 
judge.  
Chief Judge Rader’s stellar educational and academic 
background makes him highly qualified for his work on the 
Federal Circuit and as Chief Judge. It is no surprise that Chief 
Judge Rader is an excellent writer. He graduated magna cum laude 
from Brigham Young University with a degree in English and 
received his J.D. with honors from George Washington University 
Law Center in 1978. He maintains an academic connection on the 
court by serving as a professor of patent law at the George 
Washington University Law School, Georgetown University Law 
Center, the University of Virginia School of Law, and other 
university programs in Tokyo, Taipei, New Delhi, and Beijing. His 
passion for teaching and excellence in the law has earned him 
numerous awards. 
In addition, Chief Judge Rader’s academic scholarship includes 
                                                                                                         
* This Article was originally presented as the keynote address at the 
University of Washington School of Law’s Center for Advanced  
Study & Research on Intellectual Property University of Washington School of 
Law on July 22, 2011, by the Honorable Marilyn L. Huff, Southern District of 
California. 
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two books on patent law, a leading textbook on U.S. patent law 
titled Cases and Materials on Patent Law,1 and Patent Law in a 
Nutshell,2
Beyond his academic excellence, Chief Judge Rader has 
extensive experience on the Hill. He served as counsel in the 
House for members serving on the Appropriations, Interior, and 
Ways and Means Committees, and, in the Senate, was Chief 
Counsel to Subcommittees for the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
This experience serves him well on the court, and his opinions 
reflect his statutory deference. To quote Chief Judge Rader’s own 
words in his Bilski dissent, “When all else fails, consult the 
statute.”
 both co-authored with one of my law school professors, 
Martin Adelman. It is through Professor Adelman’s great teaching 
that I started on my legal career, and it is at his suggestion that I 
speak about Chief Judge Rader’s opinions concerning the use of 
experts in intellectual property cases. 
3
 Prior to serving on the Federal Circuit, Chief Judge Rader was 
appointed by President Reagan in 1988 to the United States Claims 
Court, now the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. After his nomination 
for the Federal Circuit by President George H.W. Bush, he started 
with the court in August 1990. He became Chief Judge on June 1, 
2010, and is setting his mark as the leader of that court. 
  
As a trial judge, I will focus on a familiar topic—the use of 
experts—and leave the remaining speakers to comment on Chief 
Judge Rader’s other contributions to patent law. I will highlight 
Chief Judge Rader’s discussion of the use of expert testimony in 
three areas: use of an expert in claim construction, use of a court-
appointed expert for technical assistance, and limits on an expert’s 
opinions through the trial court’s role as a gatekeeper. 
I begin with one of Chief Judge Rader’s earlier opinions while 
sitting as a trial judge, Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of 
Japan, Ltd.4
                                                                                                         
1 MARTIN ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS IN PATENT LAW (2d 
ed. 2003). 
 Looking back to the early years of Chief Judge 
Rader’s career on the Federal Circuit, there was nothing called a 
2 MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., PATENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL (2007). 
3 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
4 906 F. Supp. 798 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
2
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Markman hearing until 1995, when the Federal Circuit decided 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.5 Afterwards, Chief Judge 
Rader was one of the first judges to use an expert in a Markman 
claim construction hearing. Sitting as a trial judge in Loral, Chief 
Judge Rader held a two-day bench hearing in August of 1995 on 
the meaning of the claims with experts from each side. The claims 
involved an improvement of semiconductor devices. The parties, 
not surprisingly, disputed certain claim terms. Chief Judge Rader 
provided that “[t]he extensive briefing convinced this court of the 
need for expert testimony to enlighten the meaning of claim terms 
to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention.”6
Extrinsic evidence may demonstrate the state of the 
art at the time of the invention and thus assist the 
court in the construction of the patent claims. The 
extrinsic evidence provides assistance to the court 
in understanding how someone skilled in the art at 
the time of the invention would understand the 
claims.
 As a 
result, the court heard expert testimony on the meaning of the 
claim terms. Chief Judge Rader explained:  
7
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc.,
 
8 the views of the Federal Circuit 
judges on when and how extrinsic evidence could be considered in 
claim construction shifted for some years from Chief Judge 
Rader’s favored use of experts in Loral, to disfavored by the panel 
in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,9 to permissible for 
dictionaries in Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,10 until 
the en banc Federal Circuit decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp.11
                                                                                                         
5 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 
reaffirmed that extrinsic evidence may be useful to confirm what a 
person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood at 
6 Loral, 906 F. Supp. at 802. 
7 Id. at 803 (citing Markman, 52 F.3d at 980-81) (citation omitted). 
8 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
9 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
10 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
11 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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the time of the invention—exactly Chief Judge Rader’s use in 
Loral—while stating that intrinsic evidence is of paramount 
importance and the starting point of the claim construction 
analysis.12
Chief Judge Rader’s early use of experts in a Markman hearing 
is consistent with the reported claim construction practice of a 
majority of federal judges. In a 2008 survey of claim construction 
by the Federal Judicial Center, 65 percent of federal judges 
reported that they considered expert testimony or a report from a 
science or technology expert as extrinsic evidence as a part of the 
Markman process.
  
13 This widespread use of experts in claim 
construction adds to the debate of whether claim construction is 
purely a question of law with the resulting and current de novo 
review, the conclusion of Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,14 
or whether claim construction may involve underlying questions of 
fact, as reflected by Chief Judge Rader’s dissent from a denial of a 
petition for rehearing en banc in Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, Inc.15 He wrote, “I urge this court to accord deference to 
the factual components of the lower court’s claim construction.”16
What conclusions do we reach concerning Chief Judge Rader’s 
use of an expert in claim construction? First, he practices what he 
preaches by his willingness to serve on the district court. Second, 
he recognizes that trial judges may need to understand how 
someone skilled in the art at the time of the invention would 
understand the claims. Third, he recognizes the possibility that the 
Federal Circuit might review whether trial courts should be 
afforded deference in some cases for factual findings in claim 
construction. 
 
The panelists may, during the conference, give their views on 
whether Chief Judge Rader’s dissent is likely to gain traction. 
Beyond claim construction, the second area I will address is 
                                                                                                         
12 Id. at 1319.   
13 REBECCA N. EYRE ET AL., PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION: A SURVEY OF 
FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 20 (2008), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/ 
pdf.nsf/lookup/patclaim.pdf/$file/patclaim.pdf. 
14 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
15 469 F.3d 1039, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
16 Id. 
4
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Chief Judge Rader’s opinion concerning the appointment of the 
court’s own technical experts. The technical complexity of many 
patent claims may lead trial judges to seek the assistance of court-
appointed experts, special masters, or technical advisors for 
assistance in the case.  
Chief Judge Rader, in Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. v. O2 
Micro International Ltd.,17 affirmed the trial court’s decision to 
appoint its own technical expert. This was an unusually complex 
case with starkly conflicting expert testimony by the parties’ own 
experts. Citing to Federal Rule of Evidence 706(a), which permits 
a court to appoint an expert either “on its own motion or on the 
motion of any party to assist the trial court,” Chief Judge Rader 
pointed out that the commentators emphasized that district courts 
rarely exercised their authority to make such appointments.18 After 
a full review of the record, Chief Judge Rader perceived no abuse 
of discretion under the regional law that permitted wide latitude in 
such appointments. He acknowledged that “[t]he predicaments 
inherent in court appointment of an independent expert and 
revelations to the jury about the expert’s neutral status trouble this 
court to some extent” but also noted the trial court’s careful 
admonitions to the jury concerning use of a court-appointed 
technical expert.19
The final area involving experts I will highlight is Chief Judge 
Rader’s consistent reference to the role of the trial court as a 
gatekeeper under Daubert and Evidence Rule 702 to ensure that 
scientific, economic, or opinion evidence presented by an expert 
has a sound foundation before presentation to a judge or jury. 
Interestingly, the Daubert case originated in my district before the 
judge who had his chambers next to mine, the first African-
American judge in San Diego County, the beloved Earl Gilliam. 
When counsel put a French pronunciation to the Daubert case, I 
 In Monolithic Power, Chief Judge Rader 
thoughtfully pointed out the potential dangers of an independent 
expert, carefully evaluated the trial court’s record, and provided 
guidance to the bench and the bar about a cautious, yet deferential 
approach to court-appointed technical experts.  
                                                                                                         
17 558 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
18 Id. at 1346-47.  
19 Id. at 1348.  
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smile and quietly reflect on the fact that to Judge Gilliam, it was 
simply Daubert. The principle was that an expert needed to have a 
sufficient scientific foundation before offering an opinion on 
scientific evidence to the jury. In that case, the issue was medical 
causation of a birth defect.20
Chief Judge Rader provides district judges with a clear path to 
follow for the admission of expert testimony when evaluating the 
economic analysis to support patent damages. Recently, in IP 
Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc.,
  
21 Chief Judge Rader applied the 
relevant standards and granted a motion to strike the testimony and 
expert report as inadmissible to establish reasonable royalty 
damages, but permitted the parties to remedy the deficiencies in 
the expert’s analysis. Chief Judge Rader started out his analysis 
with the Daubert principle that the district courts act as 
gatekeepers tasked with the inquiry into whether expert testimony 
is not only relevant, but reliable.22 He then noted that a reasonable 
royalty contemplates a hypothetical negotiation between the 
patentee and the infringer at a time before the infringement began 
under the Georgia-Pacific Corp. v U.S. Plywood Corp. factors.23 
Although some approximation is permitted, the Federal Circuit 
requires sound economic and factual predicates for that analysis.24 
Where sound economic and factual predicates are absent from a 
reasonable royalty analysis, Rule 702 requires a court to exclude 
the unreliable proffered evidence, either before trial on a motion to 
the court, as Chief Judge Rader did in IP Innovation, or on a post-
trial motion as occurred in Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard 
Co.25
Chief Judge Rader has been careful to require sound 
foundations for expert opinions at all stages of the litigation. For 
example, he reviewed the sufficiency of an expert’s opinion at 
 
                                                                                                         
20 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
21 705 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Tex. 2010). 
22 Id. at 689 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589). 
23 Id. at 691 (citing Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. 
Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)). 
24 Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
25 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).       
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summary judgment in Intellectual Science & Technology, Inc. v. 
Sony Electronics, Inc.26 Applying the standard of regional circuit 
law of the Sixth Circuit that was similar to the Federal Circuit’s 
standard in Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. Northern Telecom Ltd.,27 he 
concluded that an expert opinion submitted in the context of a 
summary judgment motion must set forth facts and, in doing so, 
outline a line of reasoning arising from a logical foundation.28 An 
expert’s unsupported conclusion on the ultimate issue of 
infringement will not alone create a genuine issue of material fact. 
Moreover, a party may not avoid that rule by simply framing the 
expert’s conclusion as an assertion that a particular critical claim 
limitation is found in the accused device.29
When expert methodology is sound, and the evidence relied 
upon is sufficiently related to the case at hand, disputes about the 
degree of relevance or accuracy may go to the testimony’s weight, 
but not its admissibility. As cited in the per curiam opinion in 
ResQnet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., where Chief Judge Rader was 
one of the panel judges, “‘[d]etermining a fair and reasonable 
royalty is often . . . a difficult judicial chore, seeming often to 
involve more the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge.’”
  
30 
The hypothetical negotiation “necessarily involves an element of 
approximation and uncertainty.”31
When the expert uses speculative damages, Chief Judge Rader 
has been careful to explain why such speculative testimony should 
be disregarded. In Cornell, an expert used inflated damages 
calculations without tying those numbers to the permissible 
economic standards. Chief Judge Rader acknowledged that with 
proper proof, a party may invoke the entire market value rule to 
include within the royalty base both infringing and non-infringing 
 But a damages calculation must 
not be speculative. 
                                                                                                         
26 589 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
27 216 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
28 Intellectual Sci. & Tech., Inc., 589 F.3d at 1183-84. 
29 Id. at 1184. 
30 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & 
Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).  
31 Id. at 881 (quoting Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. 580 F.3d 1301, 
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
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elements where the smaller component is the basis for consumer 
demand of the larger product. Chief Judge Rader emphasized that 
plaintiff “did not heed this court’s warning” that any royalty base 
proffer must account for the fact that the infringing processor 
covered by the patent at issue is a small component of a larger 
server and workstation.32
Recent Federal Circuit cases where Chief Judge Rader served 
on the panel, such as Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.
 He concluded that no reasonable jury 
could have relied on the inflated royalty base in determining 
Cornell’s damages award.  
33 and 
ResQnet,34 have required sound economic principles for patent 
damages awards. Interestingly, Chief Judge Rader noted in a recent 
interview when he took over as Chief Judge that earlier cases such 
as Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc.;35 Grain Processing Corp. v. 
American Maize-Products Co.;36 Riles v. Shell Exploration & 
Production Co.;37 and Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech 
Microelectronics International, Inc.38 already stated that sound 
economic principles must be present before the court would allow 
a jury finding of damages to stand. For example, in Grain 
Processing, the court stated, “To prevent the hypothetical from 
lapsing into pure speculation, this court requires sound economic 
proof of the nature of the market and likely outcomes with 
infringement factored out of the economic picture.”39
In sum, Chief Judge Rader’s writings on the subject of the use 
of experts demonstrate his expertise and wisdom on the Federal 
Circuit. Chief Judge Rader has consistently advocated that the trial 
court’s duty is to be a gatekeeper to ensure that sound economic 
principles are used to avoid presenting junk science to a jury. He 
carefully assessed the use of technical experts and provided 
practical guidance for the cautious use of experts with proper 
 
                                                                                                         
32 Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 287 
(N.D.N.Y. 2009).  
33 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
34 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
35 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
36 185 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
37 298 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
38 246 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
39 Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1350. 
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instructions to the jury. His experience at the district court and the 
Federal Circuit opinions have offered helpful advice for trial 
judges to assess what expert testimony is admissible and what 
testimony should be excluded.  
As a trial judge, I commend Chief Judge Rader for his 
willingness to serve as a district judge. Not only does it provide 
help to the districts, but the circuit judges better understand the 
issues that may arise in the trial court setting. I also admire Chief 
Judge Rader’s good nature and sense of humor. In an interview 
conducted last year, Chief Judge Rader laughingly noted that he 
might be reversed, like any other trial judge with a case on appeal 
to the Federal Circuit. Applying sound statistical principles to an 
analysis of potential reversal rates, I can safely predict that it is far 
more likely that I would be reversed by the Federal Circuit than 
Chief Judge Rader. In conclusion, the bench and bar are fortunate 
to have Chief Judge Rader as a leader in the law and as Chief 
Judge of the Federal Circuit. We all wish him many more years on 
the bench, and we look forward to learning from him in the future. 
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